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Abstract: Recent studies document that voters infer parties’ left-right positions from governing coalition arrangements.
We show that citizens extend this coalition-based heuristic to the European integration dimension and, furthermore, that
citizens’ coalition-based inferences on this issue conflict with alternative measures of party positions derived from election
manifestos and expert placements. We also show that citizens’ perceptions of party positions on Europe matter, in that they
drive substantial partisan sorting in the electorate. Our findings have implications for parties’ election strategies and for
mass-elite policy linkages.
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this arti-
cle are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at:
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/8OWJAE.
T
wo recent studies analyze how voters infer parties’
left-right positions from the composition of
the national governing coalition. Fortunato and
Stevenson (2013) find that voters perceive coalition part-
ners’ left-right positions as more similar than is implied by
the policy tone of their election manifestos, and Fortunato
and Adams (forthcoming) conclude that citizens project
the prime minister’s position onto its junior coalition
partners, but not vice versa. We extend this research to
address the following questions: Do voters apply similar
heuristics to parties’ positions on European integration, a
more focused issue than the left-right dimension and one
that is increasingly salient for European politics? Do these
heuristics have consequences for voters’ policy beliefs
and their party support? And, do citizens apply coalition-
based heuristics appropriately—that is, are their
inferences about party positions on Europe supported by
alternative measures such as experts’ party placements
and content analyses of parties’ election manifestos?
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We analyze survey data from eight Western European
party systems between 1999 and 2009, reaching three con-
clusions. First, citizens infer parties’ positions on Europe
based on a coalition heuristic: Namely, when citizens per-
ceive the prime minister’s party shifting toward a more
(less) pro-Europe position, these citizens tend to perceive
junior coalition partners shifting their policies in the same
direction. By contrast, citizens do not perceive opposition
parties shifting their policies in tandem with the prime
minister’s party.
Second, voters’ coalition-based heuristics matter, in
that they prompt partisan sorting in the electorate,
whereby shifts in voter perceptions of party positions on
Europe prompt shifts in party supporters’ positions.
Third, we show that voters privilege the coalition
heuristic over more nuanced information, in that their
perceptions that coalition partners shift their positions
in the same direction over time are not supported by
content analyses of parties’ Euromanifestos or by experts’
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2 JAMES ADAMS, LAWRENCE EZROW, AND CHRISTOPHER WLEZIEN
judgments. Given that experts plausibly weigh infor-
mation besides the composition of the government—
including parliamentary debates, politicians’ speeches
and interviews, party press releases, and government
policy outputs—this suggests that voters emphasize the
simple coalition heuristic while discounting the more
varied information sources that experts consider.
Our conclusions have several interesting implica-
tions. First, our findings on the coalition-based heuris-
tic voters apply to European integration parallel the
Fortunato-Stevenson (2013) findings for left-right poli-
cies, which suggest that this may be a general heuristic that
voters apply across diverse issue domains. This pattern is
striking, given that the theoretical rationale for inferring
parties’ positions on Europe from governing coalitions
(which we review below) is weaker than the rationale for
applying this heuristic to left-right politics. This suggests
that citizens apply this heuristic across a wide range of
policies.
Second, we find it striking that citizens’ coalition-
based inferences about parties’ positions on Europe
are not supported by expert judgments or by content
analyses of party manifestos, especially given the growing
salience of Europe as displayed in the bitter public
debates over the financial assistance packages offered
to distressed economies in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and
Portugal, and the growth of populist, anti-European
integration parties such as Golden Dawn in Greece, the
French National Front, Italy’s Five Star movement, and
the Dutch Party for Freedom. While we are reluctant to
ascribe “mistakes” to rank-and-file voters simply because
their perceptions of party positions clash with experts’
views (and with party manifestos), our study provides
some evidence that citizens should be cautious about
applying the coalition-based heuristic to European inte-
gration, although, as discussed below, it may serve voters
well for inferring parties’ left-right positions. Our article
thereby contributes to the literature analyzing potential
problems that may arise when citizens use information
shortcuts (e.g., Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Dancey
and Sheagley 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
Third, our findings suggest that junior partners in
governing coalitions should project that citizens will
project the position of the prime minister’s party onto
its junior partners. This implies that a party such as
the British Liberal Democrats, whose identity is tied
in part to its positive stance toward Europe, could
anticipate that governing with the more anti-European
prime ministerial party (the Conservatives) would
weaken its own pro-Europe image—a dynamic that
may alienate the Liberal Democrats’ pro-European core
supporters.
Will Citizens Use Coalition-Based
Heuristics to Infer Party Positions on
Europe? Theoretical Arguments
Theoretical and empirical studies explore how electoral
systems condition parties’ incentives to moderate their
policies (e.g., Calvo and Hellwig 2011), and whether par-
ties respond to their core supporters’ beliefs (e.g., Dalton
1985). These analyses implicitly assume that voters ac-
curately perceive parties’ policies, yet while survey re-
spondents’ party placements correlate with the codings
of parties’ manifestos and also with experts’ placements
(Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Dalton, Farrell, and McAl-
lister 2011), studies find that over time, citizen per-
ceptions of party policy shifts only weakly track these
alternative measures (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu
2011; Fernandez-Vasquez 2014).1 These findings raise the
following question: How and why do voters’ perceptions
change? Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) argue that voters
infer that governing parties’ positions converge on left-
right policies because voters recognize that coalition part-
ners experience pressure to compromise over policy (e.g.,
Ganghof and Brauninger 2006), and that parties with sim-
ilar positions often coalesce (Martin and Stevenson 2010).
Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) demonstrate that citi-
zens perceive coalition partners’ positions as more similar
than is implied by the left-right tone of their policy mani-
festos, whereas Fortunato and Adams (forthcoming) find
that citizens project the prime ministerial party’s left-right
position onto its junior partner(s), but not vice versa.
Here we ask: Should we expect the above findings
on citizens’ perceptions of parties’ left-right positions to
extend to more focused policy issues such as European
integration? This question is interesting because the
rationale for applying the coalition heuristic to issues that
do not map onto left-right politics appears weak. The ar-
gument that citizens will apply coalition-based heuristics
across diverse policy domains is that the considerations
outlined above may extend beyond left-right issues:
Namely, coalition negotiations plausibly encompass all
relevant policies, and moreover, the norm of collective
cabinet responsibility applies to all government policies.
By contrast, several considerations cast doubt on whether
citizens will (or should) apply coalition heuristics to
other issues. First, in most European party systems,
post-election coalition negotiations revolve primarily
around issues such as taxes and social welfare policies that
1Note that there is evidence that members of the public notice
changes in government policy outputs and respond thermostat-
ically in various countries and policy domains (e.g., Soroka and
Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012).
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THE COMPANY YOU KEEP 3
map onto left-right economic policies (Muller and Strom
2000). Citizens who recognize this pattern may hesitate to
infer governing parties’ positions on issues that cross-cut
left-right politics. Second, public opinion research
concludes that left-right issues are often most salient
to the public (Powell 2000; Soroka and Wlezien 2010),
so that citizens may perceive parties’ overall left-right
positions more accurately than the parties’ positions
on more specific dimensions. Given that citizens must
perceive (at least) one governing party’s position in order
to apply the coalition heuristic, citizens’ ignorance of
party positions on less salient dimensions hampers their
abilities to apply coalition heuristics to such issues.
We evaluate these arguments by analyzing voters’
party perceptions on a dimension that does not map
neatly onto left-right economic politics, namely, Euro-
pean integration. We analyze this dimension for two rea-
sons. First, although research finds that Europe is less
salient to citizens than are left-right issues (see, e.g., Evans
1998), its salience has increased over time (Franklin and
Wlezien 1997). This is especially true in polities such as
Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, whose governments
encountered widespread public disapproval of the auster-
ity policies they implemented to conform with the terms
of international loans; Germany, where the fall 2013 na-
tional election campaign featured intense debates over
the financial assistance packages to distressed European
Union (EU) member states; and Britain, where the Con-
servative Party has been bitterly divided on Europe for
over 20 years, prompting Prime Minister David Cameron
to promise a national referendum on European integra-
tion, scheduled to take place before the end of 2017.
Second, European integration is interesting because
research uncovers inconsistent relationships between par-
ties’ left-right positions and their stances toward Europe,
so that—even if voters infer parties’ left-right positions
from coalitions—citizens may struggle to use these es-
timates to infer parties’ stances toward Europe (see, e.g.,
Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Bakker et al. 2015; De Vries
and Hobolt 2012).2 Hence, if citizens apply the coalition
heuristic to European integration (a dimension that cross-
cuts left-right debates and one that plausibly exerts little
influence on government formation) they likely apply
this heuristic across many different issues. Finally, Euro-
pean integration is the only dimension besides left-right
2In particular, Bakker et al. (2015) uncover a curvilinear relation-
ship between parties’ left-right positions and their stances toward
Europe, with radical left- and right-wing parties typically taking
more euroskeptic positions than do moderate, mainstream parties.
The authors also identify variations in these relationships between
western and eastern European party systems. These complex, con-
textual variations plausibly depress citizens’ abilities to infer parties’
positions on Europe from their left-right positions.
for which we have extensive cross-nationally comparable
measures of citizens’ party placements. Specifically,
respondents in the European Election Studies—which
were administered in Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain at the time of the European parlia-
mentary elections held in 1999, 2004, and 20093—were
asked to place themselves and each national party on a
scale ranging from 1 (European unification has already
gone too far) to 10 (it should be pushed further).
Model Specification
We specify a regression model to evaluate how citizens’
perceptions of party shifts on European integration re-
spond to the composition of governing coalitions. Our
dependent variable is the change in the focal party j’s
policy image between the year of the current and the
previous European parliamentary election, defined as the
difference between the party’s mean perceived position
in the current European Election Study (EES) survey
and its mean perceived position in the previous survey,
computed over all respondents who provided valid party
placements. We label this variable [Party j’s perceived shift
(t)]. Our independent variables are [Party j’s perceived
position (t – 1)], which denotes party j’s mean perceived
position at the time of the previous European parlia-
mentary election; [PM party’s perceived shift (t)], which
denotes the perceived shift of the current prime minis-
terial (PM) party, again based on the EES respondents’
party placements; and [party j is in government (t)], a
dummy variable that denotes whether the focal party was
in government at the time of the current EES survey. We
specified the following model, to be estimated over all
parties except for the prime ministerial party:
Party j’s perceived shift (t)
= b1 + b2[Party j’s perceived position (t − 1)]
+ b3[PM party ’s perceived shift(t)]
+ b4[Party j is in government(t)]
+ b5[Party j is in government(t)
× PM party’s perceived shift(t)]. (1)
3In the analyses we report below, we exclude Britain, France, Greece,
and Spain because these countries did not feature coalition gov-
ernments during the period of our study. We also exclude Belgium
and Sweden from our study because subjects were not asked for
their party placements in 2004, which interrupts time-series data
for these countries.
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4 JAMES ADAMS, LAWRENCE EZROW, AND CHRISTOPHER WLEZIEN
To evaluate the relationship between the PM party’s policy
image and other parties’ images, the key coefficients are
those on the [PM party’s perceived shift (t)] variable and
the interaction of this variable with the variable [Party j is
in government (t)]. The coefficient b3 on [PM party’s per-
ceived shift (t)] denotes the relationship between changes
in the PM party’s perceived position and changes in voter
perceptions of opposition parties. A negative coefficient
would denote that voters tend to perceive opposition par-
ties shifting in the opposite direction to the PM party’s
perceived shift—an effect that might arise if voters infer
that opposition parties oppose the PM party’s policies.
The coefficient b5 on the interaction [Party j is in gov-
ernment (t)× PM party’s perceived shift (t)] denotes how
the relationship between the PM party’s perceived shift
and the perceived shifts of its junior coalition partner(s)
differs from that for opposition parties. A positive coef-
ficient on this interaction would denote that, compared
to opposition parties, voters perceive the positions of the
PM party and its junior partners shifting in parallel on
European integration—a relationship that would extend
the empirical findings of Fortunato and Stevenson (2013)
and Fortunato and Adams (n.d.), who analyze coalition
partners’ left-right images.4
Our specification also includes the party’s lagged per-
ceived position, [Party j’s perceived position (t – 1)], to
control for voters’ long-term perceptions of the party’s
position, and for whether, when party placements are
above (below) this “equilibrium,” they tend to subse-
quently shift downward (upward). We have replicated all
of our models omitting this variable, and the resulting
estimates support the same substantive conclusions that
we report below.
Finally, note that we speak in the language of
statistical “relationships” between voters’ perceptions of
different parties’ policy shifts, without specifying the un-
derlying causal processes. In particular, when voters per-
ceive junior coalition partners’ policy shifts tracking the
PM party’s shift—the pattern we estimate below—does
this occur because citizens project the PM party’s policy
shift onto its junior coalition partners, or vice versa? Or,
alternatively, do citizens update their perceptions of both
PM parties and junior partners in response to factors such
as the content of party elites’ speeches and interviews,
election manifestos, and government policy outputs?
We address these issues below, but we note here that
4We note that our specification analyzes whether voters’ percep-
tions of opposition parties and junior coalition partners are related
to their perceptions of the PM party’s short-term policy shift. This
perspective is necessary given the structure of our data, where we
have measures of voters’ perceptions of the positions of a large
number of parties but over only three time points (the 1999, 2004,
and 2009 European Election Studies).
our decision to calibrate junior partners’ and opposition
parties’ perceived policy shifts (the dependent variable in
our model) against the PM party’s perceived shift reflects
the theoretical and empirical reasons (outlined above in
our summary of the research of Fortunato, Stevenson,
and others) to expect citizens to project PM parties’
positions onto their junior partners, and not vice versa.
Results
We estimated the parameters of Equation (1) on the 56
perceived party shifts in our data set in eight European
party systems that featured coalition governments during
the period of our study: Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
Table 1 reports the set of parties that we analyzed, and
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations of the
observed values of the variables in our data set. These
values suggest that voters perceived parties undertaking
modest policy shifts on European integration during the
period of our study: The mean magnitudes of parties’
perceived shifts are on the order of 0.5 units on the
1–10 European integration policy scale (see column 2 in
Table 2). This perceived party policy stability on Europe
parallels findings on the left-right dimension (Dalton and
McAllister n.d.), and it may reflect that political parties
plausibly maintain stable policies in order to avoid
charges of flip-flopping (see, e.g., Budge 1994). Finally,
the table reports that voters perceived both governing
and opposition parties shifting toward (modestly) more
pro-Europe positions, on average; that is, the mean
value of the [PM party’s perceived shift (t)] variable is
positive—and roughly equal—for both types of parties.
This latter finding is interesting given research that
during the time period under review, governing parties
faced pressures to adopt pro-Europe positions as they
negotiated for their country’s interests in the European
Parliament (see, e.g., De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Hooghe,
Marks, and Wilson 2002). Our data suggest that, this
dynamic notwithstanding, citizens did not perceive
governing parties shifting toward pro-Europe positions
to a significantly greater extent than opposition parties.
Our data are time-series cross-sectional. Estimating
a simple regression on the pooled data can lead to erro-
neous conclusions due to unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween parties, although this problem is mitigated with
the differenced model specified in Equation (1) (see, e.g.,
Wooldridge 2002). We estimate robust standard errors
clustered by party (Rogers 1993).5
5We reestimated the model using standard errors clustered by elec-
tion, and the standard errors for the key coefficients increase only
marginally.
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
THE COMPANY YOU KEEP 5
TABLE 1 Parties Included in the Empirical
Analyses
Austria Ireland
FPO Freedom Party FF Fianna Fail
GA The Greens FG Fine Gael
OVP People’s Party Green Party
SPO Social Democratic Party LP Labour Party
Denmark Italy
DF People’s Party AN National Alliance
KF Conservatives Forza Italia
People’s Party LN Northern League
RV Radical Left Party RC New Communists
SD Social Democratic Party
SF Socialist People’s Party Netherlands
V Liberal Party CDA Christian
Democratic Appeal
Finland D66 Democrats 66
KD Christian GL Green Left
Democratic Party PvdA Labour Party
KESK Centre Party SP Socialist Party
KOK National Coalition Party VVD People’s Party for
SFP True Finns Freedom and Dem.
SSDP Social
Democratic Party Portugal
VAS Left Alliance CDU Portuguese
VIHR Green League Communist Party+
Greens
Germany CDS-PP Dem. and Soc.
CDU-CSU Christian Center+ Partido Pop
Democrats PSP Socialist Party
FDP Free Democratic Party PSD Social Democratic
GRUNEN Green Party Party
PDS/LINKE Party of
Democratic Socialism
SPD Social Democratic Party
We report our parameter estimates in column 1 of
Table 3, where the dependent variable, [Party j’s perceived
shift (t)], is the change in EES respondents’ mean place-
ments of the focal party j’s position between the years of
the current and the previous European Parliament elec-
tions. Before turning to effects pertaining to coalitions,
note that we find no evidence that being in government
directly affects voters’ perceptions of party shifts; that is,
the estimate on the variable [party j is in government (t)] is
small and insignificant. In addition, the coefficient on the
variable [Party j’s perceived position (t – 1)] is negative and
significant while the coefficient on the intercept is positive
and significant, which implies a “regression to the mean”
in voter placements; that is, when party placements are
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and
Independent Variables
Mean Minimum
Mean Absolute and Maximum
Value Value Values
(1) (2) (3)
Party j’s perceived
shift (t)
0.14 0.52 –1.35; 1.41
(0.61) (0.36)
Party j’s perceived 0.22 0.47 –0.58; 1.41
shift (t) –
governing parties
(0.54) (0.33)
Party j’s perceived 0.10 0.54 –1.35; 1.32
shift (t) –
opposition
parties
(0.65) (0.37)
Party j’s perceived 5.45 5.45 3.20; 7.56
position (t – 1) (0.94) (0.94)
PM party’s –0.10 0.47 –0.92; 0.89
perceived shift (t) (0.57) (0.30)
Party j is in 0.32 0.32 0; 1
government (t) (0.47) (0.47)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations of the
reported values. All of the variables are calibrated along a 10-point
scale for which higher numbers denote a more positive attitude
toward European integration. The measures of citizens’ perceptions
of parties’ shifts on European integration are drawn from European
Election Study (EES) survey data from Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The EES
surveys were administered in 1999, 2004, and 2009. The variable
definitions are given in the text.
unusually large (or small) relative to the historical average
placement of the party position, then subsequent place-
ments will tend to revert to values closer to this historical
average. This pattern is found in various social and physi-
cal settings, and it may reflect measurement issues and/or
underlying dynamic processes (see, e.g., Barnett, van der
Pouls, and Dobson 2005). The measurement issue is that
the party’s perceived position variable is bounded by the
endpoints 1 and 10 of the EES European integration scale,
so that when survey respondents placed a party at a radical
position at the previous time period, they could not shift
their placement of this party to a significantly more ex-
treme position at the current time period—but they could
shift their party placement toward a substantially more
moderate position. The dynamic process is that, when a
party’s lagged position was extreme, this may indicate that
the party’s most strongly pro-Europe (anti-Europe) fac-
tion was in the ascendant at the previous time period, in
which case a diminution of this faction’s influence at the
current time period might moderate the party’s position.6
6Intraparty policy alternation between party factions is consistent
with conclusions reported by Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald (2010).
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TABLE 3 Analyses of Citizens’ Perceptions of
Parties’ Policy Shifts on European
Integration
Chapel
Independent Basic EMP Hill
Variables Model Codings Experts
(1 (2) (3)
Party j’s perceived –0.22 –0.23∗ –0.20∗
position (t – 1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
PM party’s –0.07 –0.08 0.05
perceived shift (t) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
Party j is in 0.11 0.11 0.15
government (t) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
PM party’s 0.73∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.67∗∗
perceived shift (t)
× Party j is in
government (t)
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Party j’s shift (t) – –0.24
EMP codings (0.23)
Party j’s shift (t) – 0.26
Chapel Hill
experts
(0.14)
Intercept 1.27∗ 1.31∗ 1.16∗
(0.60) (0.60) (0.55)
R2 0.21 0.23 0.26
Note: N= 56. Standard errors (clustered by party) are in parenthe-
ses. For these analyses, the dependent variable was the change in
the focal party’s perceived position on European integration at the
time of the current European parliamentary election compared to
the previous election, as perceived by all European Election Study
(EES) respondents who provided valid party placements. The data
are from EES surveys administered in Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal, near the
times of the elections to the European Parliament held in 1999,
2004, and 2009. For these analyses, the parties’ positions as per-
ceived by the survey respondents were all calibrated along a 1–10
scale where higher numbers denote more pro-Europe positions.
The independent variables are defined in the text.
∗∗p  .01, ∗p  .05, two-tailed tests.
Below, we discuss robustness checks in which we reesti-
mated our models while omitting the lagged perceived
party position variable, which support substantive con-
clusions that are identical to those we also discuss below.
We now consider the coalition-based effects that in-
terest us. If citizens’ perceptions of the PM party’s policy
shift are related to opposition parties’ perceived shifts,
we would expect a significant coefficient on the variable
[PM party’s perceived shift (t)]. However, the estimate is
near zero and statistically insignificant. By contrast, cit-
izens’ perceptions of junior coalition partners’ shifts are
strongly related to the PM party’s perceived shift: The
coefficient on the interacted variable [party j is in gov-
ernment (t) × PM party’s perceived shift (t)], +0.73, is
statistically significant (p < .01) and denotes that, com-
pared to opposition parties, citizens shift their percep-
tions of junior partners’ positions in tandem with the
PM party’s perceived shift. The conditional effect, +0.66
(s.e. = 0.11, p < .001), is the sum of the parameter esti-
mates on the [PM party’s perceived shift (t)] variable and
the [party j is in government (t) × PM party’s perceived
shift (t)] variable, and it implies that a one-unit perceived
shift toward a more (less) pro-Europe position by the
PM party is associated with a 0.66-unit shift in citizens’
perceptions of junior coalition partners in the same di-
rection, where all parties’ positions are calibrated along a
1–10 scale. This estimate implies that the difference be-
tween a perceived PM party shift of –0.32 units on the
European integration scale (one standard deviation be-
low the mean value for governing parties in our data set)
and a perceived PM party shift of +0.76 units (one stan-
dard deviation above the mean) is associated with an in-
crease of 0.71 units in the junior partner’s perceived shift.
Given that the values of the governing parties’ perceived
shifts in our data range from –0.58 units to +1.41 units
(see column 3 in Table 2), this difference of 0.71 units is
more than one-third of the entire range of values in our
data.
Figure 1 depicts the effects of perceived PM party
shifts on junior coalition partners’ and opposition par-
ties’ perceived shifts. The former are displayed as a dot-
ted line and the latter as a solid line (with shaded con-
fidence intervals).7 The figure illustrates that perceived
PM shifts exert no effect on citizens’ perceptions of op-
position parties but a strongly positive effect on per-
ceptions of coalition partners. These patterns suggest
that voters employ a coalition-based heuristic to update
their perceptions of party policy positions on European
integration.
Do Voters Apply the Coalition-Based
Heuristic Appropriately? Comparing
Voters’ Perceptions of Party Shifts with
Experts’ Perceptions and Party Manifestos
Our computations imply that citizens perceive the posi-
tions of prime ministerial parties and junior coalition
partners—but not opposition parties—shifting in the
same direction over time on European integration. While
7These estimates are calculated while holding the [Party j’s perceived
position (t – 1)] variable at its mean value. The confidence intervals
are calculated so as to allow us to reflect statistical significance at
the .05 level.
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FIGURE 1 Predicted Effects of Perceived PM Party Shifts
on Perceived Shifts by Coalition Partners and
Opposition Parties.
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Note: The figure charts the predicted effects of the [PM party’s perceived
shift (t)] variable on the [Party j’s perceived shift (t)] variable, for op-
position parties (dotted line) and junior coalition parties (solid line),
computed for the coefficient estimates reported in Table 3 (Model 1).
The shaded regions are set so that the probability is under .05 that the pre-
dicted values overlap. For these analyses, the [Party j’s perceived position
(t – 1)] variable is set at its mean value.
these patterns suggest that citizens apply coalition heuris-
tics, an alternative explanation is that citizens weigh other
factors, such as parties’ election manifestos, party elites’
speeches and interviews, and government policy outputs.
Suppose, for instance, that junior coalition partners up-
date their policy statements to support the prime minis-
ter’s policies, and that citizens respond to these statements
rather than to the fact of the coalition itself. In this case,
failure to control for party elites’ policy statements may
prompt the spurious conclusion that citizens employ a
coalition-based heuristic.
To address this possibility, we analyzed the policy
tones of the Euromanifestos that the parties in our data
set published in the run-ups to the European parlia-
mentary elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009. Specifically,
we analyzed the codings of party positions on European
integration derived from the European Manifesto Project
(EMP) analyses of parties’ Euromanifestos8 to assess
whether these EMP codings display significantly positive
8The EMP coders counted the percentages in each Euromanifesto
dedicated to 14 pro-EU and 15 anti-EU issues, and then sub-
tracted the percentage of anti-EU mentions from the percentage
correlations between the stated policy shifts of PM
parties and those of their junior coalition partners.
In fact, the EMP codings display little tendency for
PM parties and their junior coalition partners to shift
their positions in the same direction over time. The cor-
relation between the EMP-based codings of PM parties’
shifts on European integration and junior partners’ shifts
is weak and insignificant (r = .18, p = .44). This implies
that citizens’ strong tendencies to perceive coalition part-
ners shifting their positions in the same direction (r= .65,
p = .004) is not due to citizens’ responses to party man-
ifestos. Moreover, given findings that party elites co-
ordinate their overall election campaign messages with
the policy tone of their manifestos (Adams, Ezrow, and
Somer-Topcu 2011), this suggests that voters’ perceptions
that coalition partners shift their positions in tandem is
not a response to the overall policy message parties convey
during election campaigns.
of pro-EU mentions. Details on the methodology for coding Eu-
romanifestos can be found on the project website: http://www.ees-
homepage.net/seiten/euromanifestos.html.
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The proposition that voters discount campaigns for
the European Parliament will not surprise scholars who
classify these contests as “second-order” elections that
arouse little public interest (see, e.g., De Vreese et al.
2006). To address the possibility that citizens respond to
information beyond that conveyed during these election
campaigns, we analyzed political experts’ perceptions of
parties’ policy shifts on Europe. Experts plausibly weigh
all relevant information when estimating party positions,
including party elites’ speeches and interviews, party press
releases, parliamentary debates, election manifestos, and
government policy outputs. Hence, if experts perceive
coalition partners’ policies shifting in the same direction
over time, this may indicate that ordinary citizens perceive
this pattern because they respond to diverse information
sources, as opposed to relying on the coalition heuristic.
Our measure of experts’ perceptions is derived from
the Chapel Hill expert surveys (see Bakker et al. 2015),
in which experts placed each party in their party sys-
tem on a scale running from 1 (strongly opposed towards
European integration) to 7 (strongly in favor of European
integration). We rely on the 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2010
Chapel Hill surveys, using linear interpolations to cali-
brate the experts’ mean party placements against voter
placements derived from the 1999, 2004, and 2009 EES
surveys. The correlation between experts’ perceptions of
PM parties’ and junior partners’ shifts on Europe is weak
and insignificant (r = .28, p = .27), which suggests that
(1) rank-and-file voters rely more strongly on the coali-
tion heuristic than do experts and (2) voters’ perceptions
that coalition partners’ positions shift together are not
due to the non-coalition-related information that experts
plausibly prioritize.
Multivariate Analyses That Incorporate Manifesto
Codings and Expert Perceptions. To further substan-
tiate our conclusions, we reestimated the parameters of
models identical to Equation (1) above except that we
controlled for shifts in the policy tone of the parties’
Euromanifestos, and for experts’ perceptions of party
shifts. For these analyses, we recalibrated the EMP
codings of party manifestos, along with experts’ party
placements, from the original scales (ranging from –100
to +100 in the EMP codings and from 1 to 7 in the
Chapel Hill surveys) to a 1–10 scale, which matches the
scale from the European Election Study surveys.9
9Specifically, we set each expert respondent i’s placement xij of party
j on the 1–7 scale to the value [1.5(xij) – 0.5], which recalibrates
these placements to a 1–10 scale. Similarly, we set each EMP coding
xj of party j on the –100 to+100 EMP scale to the value [0.045(xj)
+ 5.5], which again recalibrates these codings to a 1–10 scale.
Column 2 in Table 3 reports parameter estimates
for a Euromanifesto Project (EMP) codings model that
includes the variable [Party j’s shift (t) – EMP codings],
which denotes the change in the party’s stated position in
the current European parliamentary election compared
to the previous election, based on the EMP codings. The
coefficient estimate on this variable is small and insignif-
icant, which implies that citizens do not respond to party
Euromanifestos.10 Moreover, the estimates on the vari-
ables [PM party’s perceived shift (t)] and [party j is in
government (t) × PM party’s perceived shift (t)] continue
to support our conclusion that citizens’ perceptions of ju-
nior partners’ policy shifts—but not of opposition parties’
shifts—track the PM party’s perceived shift: Specifically,
a one-unit shift in the PM party’s perceived position is
associated with a 0.62-unit shift in the same direction in
citizens’ perceptions of junior partners.
Column 3 in Table 3 reports parameter estimates for
an expert placements model that is identical to Equation
(1) above except that we included an additional variable,
[Party j’s shift (t) – Chapel Hill experts], that denotes
the change in the experts’ mean placement of party j in
the year of the current European parliamentary election
compared to the previous election. We estimate a positive
coefficient on this variable, indicating that citizens’
perceptions of party shifts track experts’ perceptions.11
In addition, the estimates on the variables [PM party’s
perceived shift (t)] and [party j is in government (t) ×
PM party’s perceived shift (t)] continue to imply that
citizens update their perceptions of junior partners and
the PM party in tandem—specifically, that a one-unit
shift in the PM party’s perceived position is associated
with a 0.72-unit shift in the same direction in citizens’
perceptions of junior coalition partners.12 It is striking
that we estimate such large effects when controlling for
experts’ perceptions, for this implies that rank-and-file
voters rely on the coalition-based heuristic more heavily
than do political experts. To see this, note that if experts
and rank-and-file voters weighed coalition arrangements
equally, then our expert perceptions measure, the variable
[Party j’s shift (t) – Chapel Hill experts], should capture
10The bivariate correlation between the EMP codings of party policy
shifts and our EES-based measure of voters’ perceived party shifts
is also weak and insignificant (r= –.05, p= .63).
11The bivariate correlation between the experts’ perceptions of
party policy shifts and rank-and-file voters’ perceptions of these
shifts is statistically significant (r= .25, p= .014), which is consis-
tent with the results reported in Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu
(2014).
12That is, the sum of the coefficients on the [PM party’s perceived
shift (t)] variable,+0.05, and the [party j is in government (t)× PM
party’s perceived shift (t)] variable,+0.67, is+0.72.
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the full extent to which ordinary citizens update their
perceptions of party positions via the coalition heuristic,
in which case the coefficient estimate on the variable
[party j is in government (t) × PM party’s perceived shift
(t)] would be near zero when we control for experts’ per-
ceptions. However, our estimate for this variable remains
large and significant. This finding supports Fortunato
and Stevenson’s (2013) argument that sophisticated
citizens have less need to employ the simple coalition
heuristic than do unsophisticated citizens. Given that the
political scientists and journalists who participated in the
Chapel Hill Expert Study surveys are super-sophisticated
citizens, they plausibly have little need to rely on the
coalition heuristic to infer parties’ positions.
Robustness Checks. We performed several analyses to as-
sess the robustness of our findings. First, we reestimated
our models from Table 3 while omitting the party’s lagged
perceived position, [Party j’s perceived position (t – 1)],
which is intended to capture any regression to the mean
in party placements. Second, to assess whether voters’
reliance on the coalition heuristic was mediated by eco-
nomic conditions, we reestimated our models on subsets
of cases corresponding to higher (lower) national levels
of unemployment, inflation, and GDP growth. Third, to
evaluate the effects of possible sampling error on our mea-
sures of perceived party shifts, we reestimated our models
using errors-in-variable specifications. Fourth, we reesti-
mated our models of parties’ perceived policy shifts using
their supporters’ perceptions of these shifts, as opposed to
the entire electorate’s perceptions. These analyses, which
we report in supplementary materials posted on our web-
site, continue to support our substantive conclusions.
In toto, our results consistently imply that citizens
perceive the positions of the prime minister’s party
and its junior coalition partners—but not opposition
parties—shifting together on European integration. This
conclusion persists when we control for parties’ Euro-
manifestos, for experts’ perceptions of party shifts, for
economic conditions, and for possible survey sampling
error. Our findings on the coalition heuristic that citizens
apply to European integration mirror those that Fortu-
nato and Stevenson (2013) report on left-right policies,
which suggest that this represents a general heuristic that
citizens apply across diverse policy domains.
Some Reflections on Causal Processes and the Usefulness
of the Coalition Heuristic. While our analyses suggest
that citizens infer party positions on Europe from coali-
tion arrangements, we have not analyzed whether the
public projects the PM party’s position onto its junior
partners or vice versa, nor whether the coalition heuristic
enhances voters’ perceptual accuracy. With respect to the
first issue, we cannot parse out the reciprocal effects of PM
parties’ and junior coalition partners’ positions because
these causal processes produce observationally equivalent
patterns whereby coalition partners’ policy images shift in
tandem. We hope to eventually gain purchase on this issue
by incorporating data from the 2014 European Election
Study surveys into our analyses, so that we can analyze
a longer data series and better estimate the reciprocal
long-term effects of PM parties’ policy images and those
of their junior partners. We note, however, the strong
reasons to expect voters to project the PM party’s pol-
icy shift onto its junior partners, rather than vice versa.
In particular, Fortunato and Adams (n.d.) empirically
support this pattern with respect to left-right policies,
and the authors substantiate this finding by noting that
survey-based and experimental research concludes that
voters project that the PM party will dominate govern-
ment policy (see, e.g., Duch, Przepiorka, and Stevenson
2013), and that the norm of collective responsibility pre-
vents junior partners from differentiating their policies
from those passed by the government. This view that the
PM party—typically the largest party in the coalition—
drives government policy outputs is reflected in empirical
studies on political representation, which typically esti-
mate the government’s position as the mean position of
the governing parties weighted by their sizes (e.g., Powell
2000; Warwick 2001). Q2
Hence, there is a strong case that citizens use the PM
party’s position on Europe to infer the positions of its ju-
nior partners. In addition, given the heavy media coverage
of the prime minister’s speeches and policy statements,
compared to stated positions by other cabinet members,
it is plausible that voters infer the PM party’s positions
from these statements and use them as a baseline to infer
junior coalition partners’ positions.
The question of whether citizens correctly apply the
coalition heuristic to European integration is complex be-
cause the answer depends on the validity of the alternative
measures of party positions we have analyzed, namely,
Euromanifesto codings and experts’ judgments—a topic
that has prompted widespread debate (see, e.g., Bakker,
Jolly, and Polk 2012; Benoit, Mikhaylov, and Laver 2009).
While we must proceed cautiously here, we note that
neither of these alternative measures supports citizens’
perceptions that PM parties and their junior partners
shift their policies in tandem. Furthermore, as discussed
above, the theoretical rationale for applying the coalition
heuristic appears weaker for European integration than
for left-right politics.
At the same time, two alternative considerations cast
the coalition heuristic in a more positive light. First, in the
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absence of more specific information, voters’ application
of this heuristic may enhance their inferences about party
positions across most issue areas, even if it does not in the
(unusual) case of European integration. In this regard, re-
cent research by Cahill and Adams (2014) concludes that
coalition partners do in fact converge on issues pertaining
to both economic policy and libertarian-authoritarian is-
sues. This suggests that voters’ application of the coalition
heuristic is a sensible approach to inferring party posi-
tions across many issue areas, even if it is less useful with
respect to European integration than with respect to other
issues. Second, we are reluctant to ascribe “mistakes” to
rank-and-file voters when their perceived party positions
clash with experts’ perceptions, not only because this
judgment presupposes that expert judgments are error-
free, but also because this issue raises the following ques-
tion: How does one conceptualize a party’s issue position?
In particular, given that the norm of collective cabinet re-
sponsibility may be interpreted—at the extreme—as im-
plying that all coalition partners share identical positions,
namely, the positions embodied in the government’s ac-
tual policy outputs, one can make a case that the coalition
heuristic is “correct” by definition. While most scholars
would see this judgment as overly simplistic, there is room
for reasonable disagreement over how much coalition
partners’ issue positions are defined by their concrete ac-
tions (namely, their decision to join the government and
to endorse its policies) versus the statements coalition
partners issue in their policy manifestos, speeches, press
releases, and so on. Our analyses suggest that in weighing
the import of words versus actions, rank-and-file vot-
ers privilege coalition partners’ actions—in particular,
their decision to participate in the coalition cabinet—to
a greater extent than do political experts, who appear
attuned to more varied sources of information.
Do Citizens Update Their Party Support
and/or Their Policy Views in Response to
Parties’ Perceived Shifts? Analyses of
Partisan Sorting
Our finding that citizens apply the coalition heuristic to
European integration arguably only matters if citizens
also react to parties’ perceived shifts by updating their
own policy views and/or their party support (i.e., that
we observe partisan sorting in response to voters’ per-
ceptions). Previous studies find that citizens take policy
cues from parties on European integration (Gabel 1998;
Ray 2003b; Steenbergen, Edwards, and De Vries 2007)
and also at times choose parties based on this issue (Ray
2003a), so that we expect to observe partisan sorting in
response to voters’ shifting perceptions of party positions.
In analyses of individual-level panel data, we might
parse out whether citizens update their party support
as opposed to their policy views. However, because we
analyze aggregate time-series cross-sectional data, we
instead estimate the extent to which either process occurs.
Our logic is simple: If parties’ perceived policy shifts
prompt citizens to update their party support and/or
their policy views, we should observe the positions of a
party’s supporters shifting in the same direction as the
party’s perceived shift (see, e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002).13
We specify a multivariate regression model to analyze
mass-level partisan sorting on European integration.
Our measure of the position of each party’s partisan
constituency at the time of the current European
parliamentary election is the mean self-placement of all
European Election Study respondents in that election
who supported the focal party. (The appendix presents
the party identification question from the EES surveys.)
Our dependent variable, [Party j supporters’ shift (t)], is
the change in the mean position of party j’s supporters
between the current European parliamentary election
and the previous election. Our independent variables are
identical to those in Equation (1) above, except that we
include the lagged level of our new dependent variable,
[Party j supporters’ position (t – 1)], and also [Party
j’s perceived shift (t)]. This latter variable controls for
partisan shifting in response to voters’ perceptions of the
focal party’s policy shift:14
Party j supporters’ shift(t)
= b1 + b2[Party j supporters’ position(t − 1)]
+ b3[Party j’s perceived shift(t)]
+ b4[PM party’s perceived shift(t)]
+ b5[Party j is in government(t)]
+ b6[Party j is in government(t)
× PM party’s perceived shift(t)]. (2)
Table 4 reports parameter estimates for this partisan sort-
ing specification. The coefficient on the variable [Party j’s
13That is, such a pattern conforms with a partisan switching process
whereby a party’s perceived shift toward a more pro-Europe posi-
tion (for instance) attracts new supporters who hold pro-Europe
views while prompting euroskeptics to exit the party, and also to
policy cueing whereby the party’s perceived shift prompts its pre-
existing supporters to become more pro-Europe.
14As we discuss below, we include the variable [PM party’s perceived
shift (t)] in our specification to control for the possibility that the
supporters of junior coalition partners find the PM party more
persuasive due to its alliance with the junior partner, and thereby
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TABLE 4 Analyses of Partisan Sorting on
European Integration
All Parties (1)
Party j’s supporters’ position (t – 1) –0.45∗∗
(0.13)
Party j’s perceived shift (t) 0.64∗∗
(0.19)
PM party’s perceived shift (t) –0.38
(0.25)
Party j is in government (t) 0.02
(0.20)
PM party’s perceived shift (t)× Party j is 0.20
in government (t) (0.30)
Intercept 2.33∗∗
(0.77)
N 56
R2 0.43
Note: Standard errors (clustered by party) are in parentheses. For
these analyses, the dependent variable was the change in the mean
position of the focal party’s supporters on European integration
at the time of the current EU election compared to the previous
EU election, based on European Election Study respondents’ self-
placements in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Portugal. Party supporters were defined as
those respondents who considered themselves close to a particu-
lar party (the text of the party support question is given in the
appendix). The independent variables are defined in the text.
∗∗p  .01, ∗p  .05, two-tailed tests.
perceived shift (t)], +0.64, is statistically significant (p <
.01) and denotes that when voters perceive a party shifting
one unit on the EU scale, the mean position of the party’s
supporters shifts 0.64 units in the same direction (on aver-
age), with parties’ and supporters’ shifts calibrated along
identical 1–10 scales. These estimates imply that the coali-
tion heuristic matters, in that citizens’ party perceptions
prompt mass-level partisan sorting.
By contrast, the insignificant coefficients on most
of the remaining variables provide no evidence that
coalition-based considerations prompt additional par-
tisan sorting beyond what is due to parties’ perceived
policy shifts.15 For instance, if junior coalition partners’
supporters were especially willing to take policy cues from
the prime minister, we should estimate a positive coeffi-
cient on the interacted variable [party j is in government
(t) × PM party’s perceived shift (t)], which would denote
update their own policy views in the direction of the PM party’s
position.
15We note that the coefficient on the variable [Party j supporters’ po-
sition (t – 1)] is negative and significant, whereas the coefficient on
the intercept is positive and significant, which implies a regression
to the mean in party supporters’ self-placements.
that junior partners’ supporters shift in the same direc-
tion as the PM party’s perceived shift (ceteris paribus).
However, the estimate on this variable is near zero and in-
significant. We conclude that coalition heuristics prompt
partisan sorting via their direct effect on citizens’ percep-
tions of party positions, as opposed to junior partners’
supporters taking policy cues from the PM party.
Conclusion and Discussion
Fortunato and Stevenson’s (2013) insight, that citizens
infer parties’ left-right positions from governing coali-
tion arrangements, has important implications for mass-
elite linkages. This finding illuminates how citizens use
the simple, sensible coalition heuristic to infer parties’
left-right positions, which alleviates citizens’ need to ob-
tain more complex information pertaining to party man-
ifestos and press releases, parliamentary debates, and
government policy outputs. We find that citizens apply
coalition-based heuristics to the increasingly salient is-
sue of European integration. Moreover, we show that the
coalition-based inferences citizens make about parties’
stances toward Europe matter, in that they prompt mass-
level partisan sorting on this issue.
We also identify an important difference between
citizens’ application of the coalition heuristic to European
integration, compared to left-right politics: Namely,
while research documents that governments form (and
endure) largely based on parties’ shared left-right policies,
there is no comparable evidence that coalitions revolve
around parties’ views on Europe, and we demonstrate
that the coalition heuristic we identify—namely, voters’
inferences that coalition partners’ positions on Europe
shift in tandem—is not supported by the content of
parties’ Euromanifestos or by experts’ party placements.
This suggests that when estimating party positions on
European integration, rank-and-file voters diverge from
political experts in that voters assign primacy to coalition
partners’ concrete actions—in particular, the easily
observable fact of the governing coalition itself—whereas
political experts weigh more varied sources of informa-
tion, such as parliamentary debates, party elites’ speeches
and interviews, and parties’ election manifestos.
Our study raises several additional issues for future
research. First, given the increased salience of European
integration over the past five years, parties’ coalition ne-
gotiations during this period may pertain to European
issues more than was the case during the 1999–2009 time
frame of our study. We plan to eventually revisit our anal-
yses and incorporate the data from the 2014 European
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Election Study surveys, along with parties’ 2014 Euro-
manifestos and the 2014 wave of the Chapel Hill expert
surveys in order to evaluate whether citizens’ reliance on
the coalition heuristic has increased since 2009.
Another path is to analyze how coalitions influence
citizens’ perceptions along additional dimensions such as
the environment, crime, and immigration. While the lack
of cross-nationally comparable surveys poses obstacles to
this study, our findings of a coalition heuristic on Euro-
pean integration—in combination with the Fortunato-
Stevenson (2013) findings on left-right issues—suggest
that this heuristic may be a general one that citizens apply
to various domains.
An additional extension is to explore the dynamics
of coalition-based effects under minority governing
arrangements. For example, in 2010, the Dutch minority
coalition, composed of the People’s Party for Freedom
and Democracy (VVD) and the Christian Democratic
Appeal (CDA), governed with the aid of the far-right,
anti-EU Party for Freedom (PVV), which supported the
government from outside the formal coalition. We plan
to evaluate whether voters apply the coalition heuristic to
such government support parties that remain officially
outside the cabinet. This issue is relevant to the strategic
calculations of radical right parties throughout Europe
whose electoral appeal is tied to their anti-EU stances,
including the National Front in France, Golden Dawn
in Greece, the British National Party, and the Dutch
PVV. To the extent that these parties’ images as staunch
anti-EU parties are compromised when they provide
informal support to more moderate governing parties,
these radical right parties may have electoral incentives
to withhold support from the government.
In this article, we have extended the study of coalition
heuristics to European integration policy. We have shown
that citizens apply the heuristic to this policy domain
and that the inferences citizens draw about party policy
shifts prompt partisan sorting in the electorate. We do
see various promising extensions, discussed above, which
form the subject of future research.
Appendix
European Election Surveys
European integration position of respondents/ parties:
“Some say European unification should be
pushed further. Others say it already has gone
too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate
your views using a 10-point scale. On this scale, 1
means unification ‘has already gone too far’ and
10 means it ‘should be pushed further.’ What
number on this scale best describes your posi-
tion?”
“And about where would you place the following
parties on this scale?”
Party identification question to identify party
supporters:
“Do you consider yourself to be close to any par-
ticular party? If so, which party do you feel close
to?”
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